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John Courtney Murray and
Martin Luther on the Relationship
Between Church and State
By FAr= ELIZABETH BURGESS*
Introduction
IT IS TEN YEARS since the death of the well-known American
Jesuit, John Courtney Murray. Murray's scholarly life exem-
plified the enormous changes which have taken place in the
Roman Catholic Church during the last fifty years. He began his
writing in the early 1940's and quickly became involved in the issue
of the relationship between Roman Catholicism and modem democ-
racy. This involvement led him to the broader question of formu-
lating a theory of the relationship between church and state which
could be applied to different political situations. Murray's work in
the area of church and state elicited strong opposition, and by the
early 1950's he had been advised to let the subject rest; at least he
should not write anything on the church-state question without clear-
ing his ideas with his superiors first. Murray, therefore, turned his
scholarly interests into other channels only to find that because of
his knowledge on church-state affairs he was appointed a peritus or
theological expert at the Second Vatican Council held in Rome from
1962-1965. He became the principal architect of the document deal-
ing with the so-called "American issue," religious liberty. The Dec-
laration on Religious Liberty, Dignitatus humanae, was passed by the
council fathers and Murray's own particular view on religious liberty
became the teaching of Vatican II.'
* A.B. 1957, Wellesley; D.Phil. 1968, University of Basel (Switzerland). Mem-
ber, American Society of Church History, 1975- . Assistant Professor of Church His-
tory, Lutheran Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. By the time of his death, two years after the close of the Vatican H, Murray
had begun to seem more and more conservative to the new generation of Catholic
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The basic structure of Murray's position on church and state can
be laid out in four points. If one reads Martin Luther's political
writings in terms of the four points that Murray makes, it becomes
clear that there is a striking similarity between Murray's understand-
ing of the relationship between church and state and Martin Luther's
doctrine of the two kingdoms.
There are, to be sure, certain difficulties in attempting to compare
these two men. Murray wrote specifically within the context of a
modem democratic system in the twentieth century. His whole thrust
was to deal with the particular question of church-state relations.
Luther's position must be gleaned from various occasional writings,
as he made no attempt to treat church-state relations in any kind of
systematic fashion. He also wrote within the framework of a six-
teenth-century world that began with the premise that the Christian
prince was concerned about the spiritual well-being of his subjects.
Luther was not a civil reformer. Modern democratic thought and
the Bill of Rights were not ideas with which he had any contact.
A second difficulty in the comparison is the problem of authority.
Murray was determined, particularly in his early writings, to make
very evident that he stood firmly within the tradition of the Roman
Catholic Church. Thus, he spent a great deal of time discussing the
understanding of the church-state relationship to be found in Leo
XIII. One is left to infer that what Murray was trying to glean from
Leo was actually his own particular position. In his post-conciliar
writings, Murray no longer felt the need to prove his orthodoxy, at
least by Leo; instead, his work during this period leaned heavily on
the concept of the "development of doctrine." It was no longer nec-
essary to find every point in earlier papal writings.2  Luther was also
concerned to be considered orthodox. His standard of orthodoxy,
however, was neither papal pronouncements nor the medieval Catholic
theologians who were by then looking at church-state issues in the light of the results
of the council. Thus, as so often happens, he seems to have fallen into eclipse after
1967. Recently two books on his life and work have appeared. Donald E. Pelotte's
book, JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, THEOLOGIAN IN CONFLICT (1975) is based on the
Murray archives. Reinhold Sebott, S. J. 's volume Religionsfreiheit und Verhaltnis con
Kirche und Staat, 206 ANALECTA GREGORIANA, Series Facultatis Iuris Canonici: Sectio
B, no. 40 (1977) is an excellent doctoral dissertation on Murray's work. Perhaps these
books signal the beginning of a Murray renaissance.
2. The question of the development of doctrine was so important for John Courtney
Murray that he later spoke of it as the most important issue at Vatican II. Murray,
This Matter of Religious Freedom, 112 AMERICA 40, 43 (1965).
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tradition. Luther made his appeal to Christ and to scripture. With-
in that framework he could refer to the church's tradition when it was
in support of Christ and scripture. This and this alone was authori-
tative for Luther.
Transtemporal Principles
Murray spoke of certain "transtemporal principles" which should
govern the church's relationship to the state in any and all political
situations. At different times Murray had different numbers of trans-
temporal principles. 3 The principles do not change in any basic
way, however, even though they are expressed in different orders or
combinations. Emphasis, however, does change. Before Vatican II
Murray's tendency was to emphasize either the freedom of the church
or the harmony necessary between church and state. After the coun-
cil, the weight of Murray's discussion fell on the duality between church
and state.
Murray's position is clearest when it is presented in four trans-
temporal principles: the duality of church and state,4 the freedom
of the church, the freedom of the state, and the necessity of coopera-
tion and harmony between the two.
The Duality of Church and State
Murray's understanding of the duality of or distinction between
church and state was grounded in his reading of Leo XIII:
The major emphasis falls on the distinction between Church and
state. This is the most prominent aspect of their relation, that
3. See Murray, Governmental Repression of Heresy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD
ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA 26, 38
(1948) [hereinafter cited as Governmental Repression] where he spoke of four such
principles, and J. C. Murray, Contemporary Orientations of Catholic Thought on Church
and State, 10 THEOLOGICAL Srtuoms, 215-17 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Contemporary
Orientations] where he appeared to reduce the number to three. The idea of trans-
temporal principles was not new with Murray. Many Roman Catholic theologians of
this century have put forward such lists of principles. See F. BURGESs, ECCLESIA ET
STATUS, THE RELATIONSHIP OF CHURCH AND STATE ACCORDING TO JOHN COURTNEY
MURRAY, S.J., 127-28 (1971).
4. The term "duality," a word often used by Murray, is not to be thought of in
a gnostic sense. Murray used it to denote two separate entities as opposed to a unity
or control of one by the other.
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it is a relation between two societies distinct in origin, purpose,
and means for achieving purposes. The Leonine statement is the
clearest and most formal one ever made by any Pope on the fact
that there are two societies and not merely two powers.5
Murray recognized that this position was not unique to Leo. He saw
the Leonine statement as reiterating and developing the pronounce-
ment of Pope Gelasius I in his famous statement Duo Sunt issued in
494. Yet in the Middle Ages this Gelasian dualism turned into two
powers within the one society, Christendom. To be sure, Gelasius
also would have insisted that the political power was in an inferior
position to and at the command of the spiritual power. Thus, Leo's
understanding of civil society as independent in its own right not only
restored the Gelasian dualism but gave it a new interpretation. This
duality and independence of civil society was also recognized by
Vatican II both in the Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis
humanae, and in the Constitution on the Church in the World Today,
Gaudium et spes.6  Therefore, this differentiation is both old and new,
part of the tradition and a product of the development of doctrine.-
Martin Luther expressed clearly the duality of the spiritual world
and secular government, the kingdom of God and the kingdom of this
world. The phrase, the doctrine of the two kingdoms (or the two
governments), has become a slogan by which one describes Luther's
understanding of the relationship between church and state. What-
ever the interpretation of Luther's position, this distinction between
the two kingdoms, the spiritual world and the temporal world, remains.
In his treatise on Temporal Authority, Luther gave the fullest state-
ment of his understanding of the two kingdoms. He was most ada-
mant about their separateness.
5. Murray, Leo XIII: Separation of Church and State, 14 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
200-01 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Leo XIII].
6. Murray, The Issue of Church and State at Vatican Council II, 27 THEOLOGICAL
STUDIES 597, 599 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Issue of Church and State].
7. Murray's summation of this point is rather tortuous: "The simple conclusion
here is that the two conciliar documents, Dignitatis humanae and Gaudium et spes,
have made a joint contribution toward the renewal of traditional doctrine with regard
to the ancient issue of Church and state. Previous confusions of the historical with
the doctrinal have been sorted out .... The relevant principles have been stated with
a new purity, which was made possible by the new perspectives in which the whole
issue was viewed. New theological insights into the concrete reality of the pilgrim
Church, and other new insights made available by secular experience (notably the
experience of the relation between religious freedom as a human right and the freedom




For this reason one must carefully distinguish between these two
governments. Both must be permitted to remain; the one to pro-
duce righteousness, the other to bring about external peace and
prevent evil deeds. Neither one is sufficient in the world without
the other. No one can become righteous in the sight of God by
means of the temporal government, without Christ's spritual gov-
ernment. Christ's government does not extend over all men; rath-
er, Christians are always a minority in the midst of non-Christians.
Now where temporal government or law alone prevails, there
sheer hypocrisy is inevitable, even though the commandments be
God's very own. For without the Holy Spirit in the heart no one
becomes truly righteous, no matter how fine the works he does.
On the other hand, where the spiritual government alone prevails
over land and people, there wickedness is given free rein and the
door is open for all manner of rascality, for the world as a whole
cannot receive or comprehend it.8
These words were written in 1523. Three years previously Luther
had addressed a major treatise to the Christian nobility in which he
rejected the idea, prevalent in ecclesiastical circles in the Middle Ages,
that the temporal power is inferior to the spiritual power and is there-
fore to be controlled and ordered by it.9 Thus, the medieval concept
of the two powers within one society found no support in Luther. He
stressed instead the two kingdoms or the two governments by which
man is ruled.
The Freedom of the Church
The second of John Courtney Murray's transtemporal principles
is the freedom of the church. At times Murray referred to the primacy
of the spiritual, at times he spoke of the transcendence of the church,
and at times he wrote of the freedom of the church. There were also
other times when he referred to all three together. This distinction
was more a matter of emphasis than an articulation of three different
ideas.
The Primacy of the Spiritual
In speaking of the transtemporal principle of the freedom of the
church in an early article written in 1951, Murray laid great stress on
8. M. LuTHER, Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should be Obeyed, in
45 Lur-ma's WonKs 75, 92 (Am. Ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as LUMHER].
9. M. Lumnsa, To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the
Reforms of the Christian Estate, in 44 LuTHEr's WoBxs 123, 126 (Am. Ed. 1962).
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the church as a spiritual power. As such it is free and independent
of the state in origin, end, and function. Because the end of the
church is man's eternal salvation, the church exercises a primacy over
man's life. "Therefore the principle of the freedom of the Church
asserts the principle of the primacy of the spiritual."' 0
Conversely, the church does not exercise jurisdiction over the
temporal power and cannot demand to use the temporal power as an
instrument to carry out its will. Murray made it clear that he held
neither the "direct power" theory nor the "indirect power" theory of
the church's relation to the secular.11 The church has no temporal
power; her power is purely spiritual. This delineation does not, how-
ever, mean that the church is limited to the sacristy or is closed out of
the temporal order, as the French Revolution attempted to do. The
church's spiritual power touches all spiritual things in the temporal
order, including all things which are both spiritual and temporal, such
as man himself.
The Transcendence of the Church
Two years later Murray was still basing the freedom of the church
on the primacy of the spiritual. Nonetheless, at this point he began
to lean more heavily on Leo XIII's emphasis on the transcendence of
the church to all political forms.' 2 The church is not only free from
the state but is also free from being tied to any particular political
form, any particular historical context. It is free to relate to the whole
of temporal society and all of its institutions. Its involvement in the
temporal world, however, is not through the civil power. "[T]he
whole Church - not only her authorities but notably her laity - is
to be engaged in establishing right relations between the Church and
10. Murray, The Problem of State Religion, 12 THEOLOGICAL STUDiEs 155, 157
(1951).
11. The direct power theory gave the church the right to direct intervention in
the temporal order. The indirect power theory, developed by Bellarmine, allowed the
church to intervene only for very special reasons, usually to depose an evil or unfit king.
12. Here Murray's concern seemed to have changed from the battle with the
French Revolution and continental liberalism, the democratic type of government which
appeared on the continent as a result of that revolution (a type of democracy which
the Roman Catholic Church rejected and still rejects, as opposed to the democracy
of the American type which came via the Anglo-Saxon tradition), to the argument
against more conservative Roman Catholic theologians who were determined to pre-
serve the ideal church-state relationship as one where Roman Catholicism is recognized
as the official state religion.
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society, meaning the whole institutional life of society, not merely
the political organs of government." 13
The Freedom of the Church
In his post-Vatican II writings Murray was no longer reacting to
the French Revolution or the "union of throne and altar" of the ancien
regime. He spoke simply but firmly of the freedom of the church.
The context of the question was no longer spiritual power versus
temporal power or the church allied with certain political forms. The
context was simply freedom: freedom of the human person, freedom
of society, freedom of the church. The church is still a spiritual so-
ciety, it is still transcendent to all political institutions, but the empha-
sis is no longer on its spirituality or its transcendence but upon its
freedom. "The freedom of the Church is the fundamental principle
in what concerns the relations between the Church and governments
and the whole civil order."14  The immediate questions, of course, are
how the church is to assert this freedom and how this freedom is to
be protected. To answer these questions, however, one must under-
stand the church in a threefold sense: it is a spiritual authority, a
juridical institution, and a community of the faithful.
On the basis of this threefold understanding of its nature, the
church makes its claim to freedom on two grounds: theological and
secular. The church's theological claim to freedom is on the basis
that it is a spiritual institution and that it has the mandate from Christ
to preach the Gospel and to bring men to salvation. This theological
claim, however, cannot be understood or judged by secular authorities,
and for this reason, the church makes its claim to freedom on a second
basis: the dignity of the person and his right to freedom in his life,
especially his religious life. Thus the church's freedom is dependent
upon the freedom of the individual. "Vithin the new perspectives
of today, the Church does not demand, per se and in principle, a
status of legal privilege for herself. The Church demands, in principle
and in all situations, religious freedom for herself and religious free-
dom for all men."' 5  The relationship between the freedom of the
church and the freedom of the individual is therefore reciprocal. The
13. Leo XIII, supra note 5, at 201.
14. Murray, Declaration of Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae), in THE Doc-
UMIENTS OF VATICAN II 675, 693 (1966).
15. Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 25 THEOLOxCAL STUDIES 503,
522-23 (1964). It should be noted that this understanding of the twofold freedom
July 1978]
church claims freedom on secular grounds, in the name of the human
person "who is the foundation, the end, and the bearer of the whole
social process."16 The individual person enjoys religious freedom to
believe and act in accordance with that belief, which means that the
individual's freedom must be recognized corporately. Therefore, all
ecclesial communities must have the right to exist in freedom. In
summary, Murray's understanding of the freedom of the church must
be understood both in terms of the freedom of the institutional church
as well as the freedom of the Christian person. There is no freedom
for one without the other.
The point at which it is most difficult to draw a parallel between
Murray and Martin Luther is on the question of the freedom of the
church. It is very hard to find much in Luther's writings on this
subject. Luther saw the institutional church of his day as having too
much freedom and power. His reaction was against the excesses of
the church. His emphasis was almost always on protecting the tem-
poral authority from encroachment by the church and at the same
time reforming the church from false doctrine. The question of the
freedom of the church as an institution was not an issue.
Later, in 1543, Luther was increasingly conscious of the danger
of the state's limiting the freedom of the church.
We desire that the functions of the church and of the courts be
kept separate . . . . Satan continues to be Satan. Under the
papacy he caused the Church to meddle in the state. Now he
desires the state to meddle in the Church. But with God's help
we propose to resist and do what we can to keep the callings
separate.1 7
Luther remained independent of all secular "defenders of the faith."
He disliked Henry VIII of England for his assumption of that role
of the church is not just a product of Vatican II. Murray made this claim much
earlier. He wrote in 1957, "First there is the freedom of the Church as a spiritual
authority. To the Church is entrusted the cura animaruin; and this divine commission
endows her with the freedom to teach, to rule, and to sanctify .... Second, there is the
freedom of the Church as the Christian people - their freedom to have access to the
teaching of the Church, to obey her laws, to receive at her hands the sacramental
ministry of grace, and to live within her fold an integral supernatural life." J. C.
MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AmERICAN PROP-
OSITION 203 (1960). (This article was first published as Church, State and Political
Freedom, in 1 MODERN AGE, 134-45 (1957).
16. Issue of Church and State, supra note 6, at 591.
17. M. LUTHER, LETTERS OF SPIRITUAL COUNSEL 345, 18 LIBRARY OF CHRISTIAN
CLASSICS (ed. and trans. by T.G. Tappert 1955).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY
and title.' Even though Luther seldom spoke of the freedom of
the institutional church, however, he admitted no power of the secular
authorities over the spiritual realm.
The temporal government has laws which extend no further than
to life and property and external affairs on earth, for God cannot
and will not permit anyone but himself to rule over the soul.
Therefore, where the temporal authority presumes to prescribe
laws for the soul, it encroaches upon God's government and only
misleads souls and destroys them.19
The secular authorities cannot c6mmand how a person is supposed
to believe; they can have no control over God's Word. In no way
can the spiritual kingdom be invaded by the temporal. Luther under-
stood this spiritual kingdom basically as the right of God's Word to
be preached and the right of men's souls to be touched by this Word
of God.
Throughout most of his life Luther took a negative view of the
juridical aspect of the institutional Church because he tended to
identify it with the Church of Rome. In 1539, in his treatise On the
Councils and the Churches, he regretted even the use of the word
"church." He would have much preferred to use the word "people."
He would, for example, have liked to translate the phrase on the church
as: "I believe that there is a holy Christian people."20  Luther had
a strong sense of the freedom of the individual Christian who is "free
lord of all, subject to none" and at the same time "dutiful servant of
all, subject to all."21 For Luther, this freedom was spiritual, not
political. Yet his understanding of Christian freedom must be seen
as a precursor of that religious freedom which has now been realized
in the political world.
The Freedom of the State
The third of John Courtney Murray's transtemporal principles is
the freedom and autonomy of the state. Obviously there can be no
18. F. HILDEBRANDT, MELANCHTON: ALIEN On ALLY? 64-65 (1946).
19. Lurrna, supra note 8, at 105.
20. M. Lurrrn, On the Councils and the Church, in 41 LurHrm's Woaxs 9, 144
(Am. Ed. 1966).
21. M. LUTnER, The Freedom of a Christian, in 31 LuTmR's Wonxs 327, 344
(Am. Ed. 1957).
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real duality between church and state unless the state partakes of
the same freedom and autonomy as the church.
Murray gave a careful definition of the state and its relationship
to society: "The state is not the body politic but that particular
subsidiary functional organization of the body politic whose special
function regards the good of the whole."22  The state's purpose is not
as broad as that of society. It is organized purely to effect the com-
mon good. The state has its foundation and source of power from
God through the natural law and through the consent and choice of
the people. The exercise of this power is always limited by its origin
and thus remains in the temporal sphere. The goal or end of the
state, the unity of society or the common good, is also in the temporal
sphere. The state cannot be asked to act beyond this limited sphere.
All that can be asked of the state is that it perform "its own political
duty of creating, or assisting in the creation of, those conditions in
society - political, social, economic, cultural - which will favor the
ends of human personality."23  Thus, the state's primary responsibility
is to promote the general welfare and guarantee the juridical order.
If the state fulfills these obligations, it has served the church in the
only way it can be asked to do. "And the modern 'welfare-state,'
simply by serving human welfare, would serve the Church better
than Justinian or Charlemagne ever did.."
24
Can the state be asked, through its governmental arm, to limit
error and repress heresy? Murray's negative answer to this question
was clear and forthright. Government is not the secular arm of the
church with the responsibility of carrying out the suppression of re-
ligious error and heresy. Nor is the state a moral person capable of
recognizing moral truth. All that the church can require of the state
is in the words of Dignitatis humanae
to supply conditions favorable to the cultivation of religious life,
in such wise that citizens may in fact be enabled to exercise their
religious rights and to discharge their religious duties, and that
society itself may enjoy the value of justice and peace which en-
sue upon the fidelity of men toward God and His holy will.
2 5
22. Murray, The Problem of State Religion, 12 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 158 n.6(c)
(1951). Murray makes extensive distinctions here between society, the state, and
government.
23. Governmental Repression, supra note 3, at 71.
24. Id. at 72.
25. Murray, Declaration of Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae), in THE Doc-
UMENTS OF VATICAN II, at 685 (1966).
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Even though the state never has the right to limit religious free-
dom, it may, according to Murray, limit forms of public expression
of religion that seriously violate either the public peace, commonly
accepted standards of public morality, or the rights of other citizens.
The state never imposes such limitation because the church has re-
quested it, however, but only because such action is necessary for
the common good of the society.
The historical relationship between the church and the state must
constantly change because the state itself is changing. Murray saw
the middle ages as a time of immaturity for the state. There was,
therefore, a need for "political tutelage, as well as moral direction,
of the political order" by the papacy.2 6 Philip the Fair changed this
relationship. The new nation state of France did not stand in the
same relationship to the papacy as the empire did. The question was
no longer sacerdotium and imperium, church and empire, but sacer-
dotium and regnum, church and kingdom.
2
7
The legal institution of the state-church, or the "union of throne
and altar" as it is often called, was the attempt of the church and the
state to work out a new relationship in the world of postreformation
confessional absolutism. This solution to the church-state problem,
however, is no longer applicable today when the problem is not sacer-
dotium and regnum but sacerdotium and civis, church and citizen.
"It is with this new 'ruler,' armed with his democratic instruments of
rule, that the Church is now confronted."
28
The major responsibility that the church has to the state is to
respect the state's autonomy. The church has no right to demand that
the state protect the religious unity of society.2 9  It has no right to
attempt a spiritual direction or correction of the temporal order. Such
direction must come from within the temporal order itself, through
its own institutions. The church's major responsibility to the secular
26. Contemporary Orientations, supra note 3, at 177, 190.
27. "It was with the new libertas regalis that the old libertas ecclesiastica had to
establish proper relations." Id. at 192. Philip IV, The Fair, was king of France from
1285-1314.
28. "It is with this new libertas civilis that the old libertas ecclesiastica has to es-
tablish proper relations." Id. at 193.
29. "Religious unity is indeed a value for society, and for this reason the state
protects the full freedom of the Church to achieve and maintain it. But this is the
Church's mission, and in it secular government has no direct share." Governmental
Repression, supra note 3, at 90.
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order is to work to safeguard both the freedom of the church itself
and the freedom of the secular order.
30
Martin Luther's perception of secular authority is tied to his
time; yet he goes far beyond his own age in his understanding of the
autonomy of the state. For Luther the secular or temporal authority
is established by God and is quite independent of the church. He
was convinced that "we must provide a sound basis for the civil law
and sword so no one will doubt that it is in the world by God's will
and ordinance."' Furthermore, temporal power is not to be exer-
cised only over the ungodly but over all people. Christians on their
part have the responsibility to support the temporal power:
Therefore, if you see that there is a lack of hangmen, constables,
judges, lords, or princes, and you find that you are qualified, you
should offer your services and seek the position, that the essential
governmental authority may not be despised and become en-
feebled or perish. The world cannot and dare not dispense with
it. 32
Although Luther did not know the modem secular state, he came
quite close to this idea in his insistence that when the prince rules,
he rules not as a Christian but as a secular figure. 3 3  In addition,
Luther's concept of the goal of the temporal was very close to the
goal of a modern secular state. The good prince, he argued, is the
one who does not rule for himself but for the good of his people. In
his commentary on the eighty-second psalm, Luther listed the three
virtues of a good prince: to secure justice, to help the downtrodden,
and to bring peace.3 4  More than once Luther spoke very warmly of
the secular responsibility of supporting the poor and caring for those
in need. Luther's ideas may not be equated with the modem welfare
30. This is a freedom "which is based on the distinction between the spiritual and
the temporal, and on the sovereignty and autonomy in its own order that the temporal,
now evolved to full self-consciousness, can legitimately claim." Murray, Towards a
Theology for the Layman: The Problem of Its Finality, 5 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 43,
70 (1944). This article from 1944 is one of Murray's earliest discussions of the church-
state issue.
31. LUTHER, supra note 8, at 85.
32. Id. at 95.
33. "Of course, a prince can be a Christian, but he must not rule as a Christian:
and insofar as he does rule, his name is not Christian but prince. The person is indeed
a Christian, but his office or his princedom does not involve his Christianity." M.
LUTHER, Sermon, The Sixth Chapter of St. Matthew, in 21 LUTHER'S WoRKs 130, 170
(Am. Ed. 1956).
34. M. LUTHER, Psalm 82, in 13 LUTHER'S WoRKs 39, 52-56 (Am. Ed. 1956).
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state. Nevertheless he clearly understood that secular authority, or-
dained as it is of God, is ordained to serve the needs of people. The
common good is the goal that temporal authority seeks.
8 5
Luther was most adamant that the church should not meddle in
the affairs of the state and should leave the temporal power to its own
autonomy. He spoke of a former tyranny of the church over the
state.30 Among the reforms he urged in his treatise, To the Christian
Nobility of the German Nation, was the exclusion of all temporal
matters from the church courts and elimination of papal attempts to
exercise power in temporal affairs. Luther went so far at one point
as to remove the suppression of heresy from the temporal power:
Again you say, "The temporal power is not forcing men to be-
lieve; it is simply seeing to it externally that no one deceives the
people by false doctrine, how could heretics otherwise be re-
strained?" Answer: This the bishops should do; it is a func-
tion entrusted to them and not to the princes. Heresy can never
be restrained by force. One will have to tackle the problem in
some other way, for heresy must be opposed and dealt with other-
wise than with the sword. Here God's word must do the fight-
ing. If it does not succeed, certainly the temporal power will
not succeed either, even if it were to drench the world in blood.
Heresy is a spiritual matter which you cannot hack to pieces
with iron, consume with fire, or drown in water. God's word
alone prevails here .... 37
Secular authority may only limit heresy for secular reasons, such as
when heresy threatens the peace of the land. Thus, heresy may be
limited only for reasons of the common good.38
The Necessity for Harmony and Cooperation
Between Church and State
The fourth of John Courtney Murray's transtemporal principles
is the necessary harmony and cooperation between the church and
35. Ltrrm, supra note 8, at 120.
36. M. Lurrnu, Psalm 82, in 13 LumT='s WoRKs 13, 42 (Am. Ed. 1956).
37. LUTHm, supra note 8, at 114. Later Luther expressed a concern that the
prince should limit the "godless" so that "the sect and false teachers are given no op-
portunity or defended against the teachers who fear God." M. LurUME, Psalm 82, in
13 LuTHER's Wonxs 39, 52 (Am. Ed. 1956). This view is not full repression of heresy
but does give the secular power some supporting role in providing beneficial circum-
stances for the work of the church. Basically, however, Luther held that heresy is a
spiritual problem.
38. See R. Som, KmCHENRECHT 546-58 (1892). Because the church and the
state are no longer bound in one unity, religious heresy is not ipso facto treason. "For
the first time in history the idea of tolerance appears here." Id. at 547.
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the state. Harmony and cooperation are essentially two sides of the
same coin, two expressions of the same relationship. Murray pointed
out that for Leo XIII the word concordia is the keynote of his ponti-
ficate.39  This concordia meant that the two societies should be in
an "orderly relationship" with one another. Vatican II, while not
losing this Leonine emphasis on harmony, stressed rather the coopera-
tion between the two. Leo had seen the relationship as that of two
authorities or two powers. Vatican II saw this authority as being
translated into service. Both the church and the state are there to
serve the human person.
40
Murray often repeated Leo XIII's reason for the necessity of
harmony or orderly relation between the two powers: "utriusque
imperium est in eosdem, the rule of both is over the same man."41
The human personality has the right to unity and integrity. With-
out this unity man himself becomes a psychological battleground; he
becomes warped. "[H]uman existence is essentially social-historical
existence. It is not permitted to introduce a dichotomy into man, to
separate his personal-interior existence and his social-historical exist-
ence." 42  Harmony between the two powers becomes essential, there-
fore.
Man is the key to the whole relationship. The goal of the two
societies is man; the necessity for harmony between the two is because
of man; this harmony is achieved by man himself. Harmony begins
in man and then is achieved in society through his actions. He is,
to quote Leo XIII, civis idem et christianus, the one person who is
both a citizen and also a Christian.4
3
The church's power is purely spiritual; its field of action is the
conscience of the human person. The state's power is only secular;
39. Leo XIII, supra note 5, at 209.
40. Thus, the cooperation is not required "by some sort of raison d'eglise but by
the dual nature of the human person." Issue of Church and State, supra note 6, at
603-04.
41. Contemporary Orientations, supra note 3, at 215, 220.
42. Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 25 THEOLOGICAL STUDiEs 522,
526-27.
43. "Moreover, in saying that the human person and his integrity as citizen and
Christian was the end and object of the harmony between the two powers, Church and
state, Leo XIII was implicitly saying that the human person by his action as Christian
and citizen ought to be the instrument and agent of establishing this harmony in actual
fact. Responsibility for the harmony rests on its beneficiary." Contemporary Orienta-
tions, supra note 3, at 222.
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it has no right to attempt to define the church or arbitrarily to decide
what the role of the church is to be. The state can only accept the
definition of the church that it finds in its citizens. Neither the church
nor the state can dictate the harmony between them. Neither deals
with the other directly but only with the individual person who stands
in both societies. The church, for its part, confronts not the state
but the Christian citizen. The church molds the conscience of the
individual Christian. The Christian, for his part, because he is also
citizen, moves into society to order and change the secular world to
conform with his Christian conscience. 44  The relationship between
church and state is no longer an institutional relationship. It is now
the person who is the crucial link between church and state. His
informed conscience becomes active in making the laws which govern
the state. In this way and this way only, the church does have an
indirect influence over the state-through the person, the Christian
citizen, the new "Christian prince."
Freedom is the new watchword for the relationship between
church and state. First, the state is free from the control of the
church, free to be itself and achieve its own ends. Second, the in-
dividual person is free, free to hear the church and free to mold society
in accordance with his conscience. Finally, the freedom of the church
is effected through the only governmental favor of religion which is
now possible-religious freedom. If any of these three elements,
the church, the state, and the human person, loses its freedom, the
whole relationship suffers. So long as freedom is maintained, how-
ever, the proper relationship between church and state will have been
achieved.45
44. "This citizen, and the institutions through which he shares in rule, are pos-
sessed of a genuine autonomy. It is only through him and through them that the
Church can reach the temporal order. . . . Standing thus in the middle . . . the
citizen looks two ways. As Christian, he looks, as it were, behind him to the Church
as the 'general teacher of faith and morals,' . . . as citizen, he looks before him to the
state, to the whole order of human life in its temporal aspects. The action of the
Church on him terminates at conscience, forming it to a sense of its Christian duties
in all their range and implications for temporal life. The Christian then as citizen,
in the full panoply of his democratic rights, prolongs, as it were, this action of the
Church into the temporal order, in all the matters in which Christian doctrine and
law has implications for the life and law and government of society." Id. at 223.
45. The problem today is still "that of the legitimate demands of the autonomy
of the temporal order as counterpoise to the demands of the primacy of the spirit-
ual. . . . But it is posited now in terms . . . of the human person, who is the 'bearer,
the basis and the end of social life,' and who as free citizen is the responsible agent
of the political processes, the participant by right of human dignity in the public power
whereby his temporal destiny is ruled." Id. at 192.
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Martin Luther, in 1523, presented for the first time in Temporal
Authority: to What Extent it Should be Obeyed46 his position on the
relationship between the spiritual and the secular worlds. He spoke
of their separation and autonomy. His desire to free the temporal
authority from what he saw as unfair meddling by the church made
him overemphasize the separateness of the two realms. For this
reason, many of Luther's interpreters have understood him to support
a separation of man's secular or political life from his spiritual life,
but such was never Luther's intention, as can be seen in his treatise
Whether Soldiers too can be Saved (1525) and in his sermons on
Matthew 5-7, the Sermon on the Mount (1530).
Although he did not use the word "harmony," it is obvious that
for Luther there are two areas in which there is a definite harmony
between the two kingdoms. First, there is the harmony they share
by virtue of their origin. Both are ordained by God and as such can-
not stand necessarily in opposition to one another. The goal of the
secular order is not the same as the goal of the spiritual order, which
is the salvation of men's souls. Instead, the goal of the secular order
is the common good, the service of others. 47  Thus the goal of the
secular order is parallel with the goal of the spiritual order; it is
there to serve people.
There is a second harmony between the spiritual and secular
which for Luther is achieved by and in the human person.
May a Christian be a secular official and administer the office and
work of a ruler or a judge? This would mean that the two per-
sons or the two types of office are combined in one man. In
addition to being a Christian, he would be a prince or a judge
or a lord or a servant or a maid - all of which are termed "secu-
lar" persons because they are part of the secular realm. To this
we say: Yes; God Himself has ordained and established this
secular realm and its distinctions, and by His Word He has con-
firmed and commended them.
4
1
Luther made it quite clear he was not speaking of some kind of
Christian commonwealth. Yet he was also not speaking of any kind
46. 45 LurrrER's WORKs 75 (Am. Ed. 1962).
47. "But a lord and prince is not a person to himself, but on behalf of others.
It is his duty to serve them, that is, to protect and defend them." M. LuTHER,
Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, in 46 LUnri's WoRKs 87, 122 (Am. Ed. 1967).
Such a prince, Luther admitted, is a "rare bird," but that fact did not change what
the goal and purpose of the secular order ought to be.
48. M. LUTHER, Sermons, The Fifth Chapter of St. Matthew, in 21 LUTH 's
Womxs 7, 13 (Am. Ed. 1956).
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of withdrawal from the world on the part of the Christian. A man
is both a Christian and an active participant in the secular order:
Just learn the difference between the two persons that a Christian
must carry simultaneously on earth, because he lives in human
society and has to make use of secular and imperial things ....
A Christian may carry on all sorts of secular business with im-
punity - not as a Christian but as a secular person - while his
heart remains pure in his Christianity, as Christ demands.
49
Murray spoke of the citizen whose conscience has been formed by the
church and who is active in the secular world, bringing the' weight
of his conscience to bear and thus achieving the harmony between the
two realms. Luther spoke of the person who operates in the secular
world but whose heart remains pure in Christianity. Thus in the
Christian person is achieved the harmony between the two worlds.
The worlds themselves remain separate, but the Christian, full mem-
ber of each, is the connecting link between them.
Luther did not say that a Christian may operate in this fashion
in the secular world; he is obligated to. The obligation is not for
the Christian's own sake or the sake of the secular world but rather
for the sake of his neighbor, for the common good. This principle is
the root of all of Luther's social ethics. Doing what is best for the
neighbor combines Christian love and concern for him with rational
common sense as to what is best in a given secular situation. One
cannot operate in the secular world with the Gospel as a guide. One
must use the means of the secular order, which are law and if necessary
the sword, to provide what is best for the common good, for the
neighbor:
Thus when a Christian goes to war or when he sits on a judge's
bench, punishing his neighbor, or when he registers an official
complaint, he is not doing this as a Christian, but as a soldier or
a judge or a lawyer. At the same time he keeps a Christian
heart. He does not intend anyone any harm, and it grieves him
that his neighbor must suffer grief. So he lives simultaneously
as a Christian toward everyone, personally suffering all sorts of
things in the world, and as a secular person, maintaining, using,
and performing all the functions required by the law of his terri-
tory or city, by civil law, and by domestic law.50
49. Id. at 111.
50. Id. at 113.
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Conclusion
There is no reason to believe that John Courtney Murray was at
any point in his life influenced by Martin Luther. Murray may have
read some of Luther's work although in all of his writing he makes
only a few passing remarks about the sixteenth-century reformer.
Most of these remarks are rather disparaging.5 1 Not withstanding
the fact that Luther wrote in the sixteenth century and Murray wrote
over 400 years later, the similarities between the two men are striking.
Both Murray and Luther placed major stress on the duality, the
distinction between church and state. Luther, of course, used the
word kingdom to refer to these two independent societies, a word that
does not fit easily into American political vocabulary. Nevertheless
it is clear that Luther was speaking of the secular or political authority
on the one hand and the church or spiritual authority on the other.
In their emphasis on duality both Murray and Luther seem to have
been cut from the same pattern.
It is harder to make a close comparison between Murray and
Luther on the question of the freedom of the church. Both believed
in the freedom of the Christian person to hear and heed the Word of
God, but the freedom for the institutional church of which Murray
spoke is not to be found in Luther. At issue here is the different
concept each man had of the role of the church, particularly the
church as a juridical entity. Their different understandings of the
institutional church, however, should not obscure the close resem-
blance between the two men in their belief that the spiritual world
belongs to God and the church and can never in any way be under
the control of the secular authority.
Both Murray and Luther recognized the full autonomy of the
secular order. Both saw the state's role as being for the common
good. Both questioned the role of the secular order in achieving
religious unity. When one takes account of the fact that Luther wrote
from within the sixteenth-century empire with its complicated system
of electors and territorial princes, his ideas are very like those of
51. He blamed, for example, the territorial principle of state care of religion on
Luther. Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 25 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 503,
522-23 (1964). The territorial system actually appeared after Luther. Thomasius is
usually credited with being its founder in 1696 with his book, DAs RECHT EVANGELISCHER
FURSTEN IN THEOLOGISCHEN STREITICKEITEN.
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Murray, who wrote from the viewpoint of twentieth-century Anglo-
saxon democracy.
Murray spoke of the Christian as the connecting link between
the two worlds of the church and the state. The Christian, his con-
science molded by the church whose member he is, goes about the
business of running the state of which he is a citizen. Luther used
a different terminology but expressed exactly the same idea: the
Christian operates in the secular world with a Christian heart. Leo
XIII's words, civis idem et christianus, could be used to describe
Luther's concept of the Christian citizen as well as Murray's. The
Christian person lives in two separate and autonomous worlds, and
he is the active and participating connection between them. This is
the harmony between the two worlds; this is how cooperation between
them is achieved.
How can one account for the fascinating similarities between
Luther and Murray in their understanding of church and state? It
is true that both men were influenced by the scholastic tradition.
Murray was a Thomist; Luther stood in the line of Occam and Biel.
In addition, both looked beyond scholasticism to the older, medieval
tradition. Luther recognized in the sixteenth century that the church's
political role, its attempt to direct or control the secular world, could
work only to the detriment of the mission of the Gospel. Luther took
the then unheard of step of stripping the church of this temporal in-
volvement. Murray looked at the twentieth-century world where
the church, in spite of its attempts to the contrary, had already lost
all vestiges of this temporal power. Perceiving that this powerless-
ness was actually to the church's advantage, Murray built his theory
around this discovery. Martin Luther eliminated much of the excess
baggage of the medieval church's relationship to the state. The
Roman Catholic Church, however, emerged from the sixteenth cen-
tury still carrying a large amount of that baggage. Thus it was left
to John Courtney Murray in the twentieth century to develop the
theory that enabled the Roman Catholic Church to take advantage
of changed circumstances and maintain a new and effective relation-
ship with the state.
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